By J.Adam Carter
Is wisdom relative? Many teachers around the humanities say that it truly is. although those that paintings in mainstream epistemology quite often contemplate that it's not. Metaepistemology and Relativism questions no matter if the type of anti-relativistic historical past that underlies normal initiatives in mainstream epistemology can on nearer inspection be vindicated.
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Extra resources for Metaepistemology and Relativism
Most of us are realists, for example, when it comes to cat discourse; we think that claims about the Tonkinese cat in the next room will be validated by how things stand. Validated in that, we think, there really are states of affairs consisting of cats existing and bearing the properties we ordinarily attribute to them – rendering some of our statements about them true. To think our statements about cats are validated by how things stand intimates how it is that we think the correctness of Metaepistemology and Realism 17 cat discourse answers to some way the world (with cats and their properties) really is – as opposed to, say, how we merely hope, imagine, agree or perceive that it is.
Let’s now consider, in the arena of epistemic facts, an example of a candidate non-trivial dependency claim. Let’s go extreme. Here I have in mind, a la Berkeley, a view we can call metaepistemological idealism about epistemic facts, a toy view about epistemic facts according to which the instantiation of epistemic properties just is an idea in the mind,73 given that reality itself is regarded as mental in nature; on this view, the states of affairs that obtain when one knows a given proposition will necessarily be mentally constituted – and thus, anything we know we know because some mental state of affairs obtains.
Call this component of the view no-mistakes. 27 As Burnyeat observes, it is clear that Plato also understands Protagoras to hold the converse’,28 according to which a proposition is true for an individual only if that individual believes that proposition. Call the converse no-unbelieved-truths: No Unbelieved Truths (NUT): If it is true for S that p, then S believes that p. No-mistakes and no-unbelieved-truths are implied by the full expression of the ‘measure’ doctrine: ‘man (sc. each man) is the measure not only of what is (sc.