By Ed Carlson
8 months upfront, one eccentric genius anticipated the beginning of history's maximum bull market–accurate to inside of 17 days and seven Dow Jones issues. Then, days prior to his demise, he known as its end–precisely. Louis Rukeyser referred to as him "uncannily accurate." The inventory investors Almanac known as his paintings "the most interesting long term forecast we've ever seen."
Honored by means of his friends, famous for his profound wisdom of background and markets, George Lindsay is now approximately forgotten. a lot of his most vital examine has been relegated to yellowing, typed newsletters. until eventually now.
In George Lindsay and the paintings of Technical research, Ed Carlson demonstrates the mammoth energy of Lindsay's equipment in today's markets. utilizing visible types, Carlson explains Lindsay's versions basically, easily, and intuitively. utilizing this booklet, traders and investors can practice those recommendations with out powerful mathematical services, and with no interpreting Lindsay's dense writing type. Carlson walks via utilizing Lindsay's "Three Peaks and a Domed House" version to discover outstanding styles in "haphazard" short-lived movements… utilizing Lindsay's "Timing process for Traders" to spot tradeable industry tops and get out of bull markets in time… predicting "decisive, frequently violent" marketplace activities, and extra. This ebook is an critical addition to any technical research library–and each technician's buying and selling arsenal.
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