By Sebastian Gorka
Yet this battle is eminently winnable if we eliminate our ideological blinders, correctly identify our enemy, and draw up a technique to defeat him. So says Dr. Sebastian Gorka, some of the most skilled and sought-after specialists on counterterrorism. Our enemy isn't "terror" or "violent extremism." Our enemy is the worldwide jihadi move, a latest totalitarian ideology rooted within the doctrines and martial heritage of Islam. Taking his cue from the previously top-secret analyses that formed the U.S. reaction to the communist risk, Dr. Gorka has produced a compelling profile of the jihadi movement—its brain and motivation—and a plan to defeat it.
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Extra info for Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War
Unfortunately, this logic is not only simplistic, it is dangerous. America has demonstrated in the past fifteen years that it is preeminent in the use of overt force. ” But so what? indd 50 2/23/16 1:22 PM The War So Far 51 extremism. If you kill one jihadist and fifteen other fundamentalist Muslims volunteer to replace him the next day, your UAV strike or special operations mission can turn into a recruiting platform for the enemy, dooming you to endless rounds of “whack-a-mole” against the growing ranks of jihadists.
And now we face an even deadlier threat in the form of the jihadi insurgency that calls itself the Islamic State (ISIS), which now controls territory in Iraq and Syria and has affiliates in more than a dozen countries from the Middle East to Africa and even Asia. My first motivation in writing this book is the reality that America’s strategic response to this new existential threat is failing. And believe me, it is an existential threat. The global jihadist movement may not yet have tank divisions at its disposal as did the Nazi regime or thousands of nuclear weapons as did the Soviets, but it has something much more important: a religious fervor combined with an un-Western degree of patience that produces a lethal and unbelievably resilient commitment to its cause.
The Soviet Union was no more. Now it was time to do the same thing to the last surviving infidel superpower by dragging it into a Dantean hell of car bombs and IEDs. And so it was that Al Qaeda sent its commanders and fighters into Iraq and the post-invasion insurgency was born. To be clear, the distressing levels of violence in Iraq after 2005 were the result of several factors and actors, not just Al Qaeda. Former Baathists—out of power and out of a job—were motivated to destabilize the new system.