By Robert S. Kaplan, David P. Norton
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The ambitions of an IT balanced scorecard contain the alignment of IT plans with company targets, the institution of measures of IT effectiveness, the directing of worker efforts towards IT targets, the enhanced functionality of expertise, and the success of balanced effects throughout stakeholder teams.
The years 1689-1763 have been years of transition within the army technology. Many books were written in regards to the battles of that interval, yet few inform how the warriors truly fought these battles utilizing the guns to hand. This e-book does. Painstakingly researched, and utilizing genuine battles for representation, it tells the reader the "how" and "why" in regards to the strategies utilized by infantry, cavalry and artillery.
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The belief that there is a potential military threat from Turkey has been reflected not only in Greek public opinion66 but also in the scholarly approach of the Greek foreign policy phenomenon (Tsakonas, 2005: 427–37). It is worth noting that, historically, a sense that the country is eternally facing external threats that are directly or indirectly undermining its territorial sovereignty has been deeply rooted in Greek mentality. 70 Especially, the introversion, defensiveness and inertia that are typical of the Greek political system and culture were long-established features of Greek foreign policy until the mid-1990s.
Democracies – the argument goes and the empirical findings suggest – rarely, if ever, fight wars on or near their home territory; they tend to cluster together in space and time, creating regional zones of peace (Gleditsch, 2002), and they are more likely than other states to submit their disputes to negotiation and arbitration instead of resorting to force (Dixon, 1994: 1–17; Raymond, 1994: 24–42; Mousseau, 1998: 210–30; Huth and Alee, 2002). 38 What one should note at this point, however, is that the above kind of reasoning tends to blur the distinction between democracy as an outcome and democratization as a process.
Greek security planning could no longer rely on the dogma of the internal danger and NATO’s defence prescriptions. To be sure, even as early as the late 1950s, NATO’s southeast flank had been experiencing periodic cycles of great tension. The emergence of the Cyprus problem in the 1950s, with the Greek–Turkish crises of the 1960s, the Greek Junta-sponsored coup of 1974 and the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in July 1974, had been complicated by a series of Greek–Turkish frictions in the Aegean region, caused by Turkey’s pressure for the revision of the Aegean status quo.